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Abstract
This article starts from the observation that popular culture resides in a contradictory space. On the one hand it seems
to be thriving, in that the range of media objects that were previously studied under the rubric of popular culture has
certainly expanded. Yet, cultural studies scholars rarely study these media objects as popular culture. Instead, concerns
about immaterial labor, about the manipulation of voting behavior and public opinion, about filter bubbles and societal
polarization, and about populist authoritarianism, determine the dominant frames with which the contemporary media
environment is approached. This article aims to trace how this change has come to pass over the last 50 years. It argues
that changes in themedia environment are important, but also that cultural studies as an institutionalizing interdisciplinary
project has changed. It identifies “the moment of popular culture” as a relatively short‐lived but epoch‐defining moment
in cultural studies. This moment was subsequently displaced by a set of related yet different theoretical problematics that
gradually moved the study of popular culture away from the popular. These displacements are: the hollowing out of the
notion of the popular, as signaled early on by Meaghan Morris’ article “The Banality of Cultural Studies” in 1988; the insti‐
tutionalization of cultural studies; the rise of the governmentality approach and a growing engagement with affect theory.
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1. Introduction
“People griping about nonwhite actors in Bridgerton but
not fussing about the Duke wearing riding boots to a
ball?! Riding boots!” (Fredericks, 2020). The above is a
tweet about the Netflix series Bridgerton. It makes light‐
hearted fun of others taking a popular television series
way too seriously. Or perhaps of mistaking popular cul‐
ture for always being about something else: Anti‐racist
activism and historical accuracy are suggested to be
equally important issues. In jest, the tweet says that we
might want to return to popular culture as popular cul‐
ture. That is exactly our starting point in this joint article.
We participated in an online roundtable on “The Power
of the Popular,” organized by IAMCR’s Popular Culture
Working Group. The theme of the discussion was the
status of popular culture in the 2020s. Even though
we approached the question from different angles, we
found ourselves in agreement that it seemed popular cul‐
ture is no longer studied as popular culture. By this we
meant that studies of the popular no longer invoke the
notion of popular culture, even when they use the term.
To be sure, media and cultural studies scholars continue
to study phenomena that would have been considered
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popular culture in the 1980s. On the surface, it would
therefore seem that we never really left the terrain of
the popular.When analyzing, say, theway Twitter contro‐
versies shape public discourse, it is clear a 1980s scholar,
magically transported to 2021, would have no trouble
approaching Twitter as a cultural forum (Newcomb &
Hirsch, 1983) where different views and parts of soci‐
ety meet and interact. That same 1980s scholar would
also approach Twitter as neither entirely top‐down nor
entirely bottom‐up, operating instead somewhere in
between the abstract forces of the cultural industries
while generating and requiring activity and enthusiasm
“from below.” Twitter comments are neither high culture
nor the kind of authentic folk culture associated with
premodernity. All of this to say that yes, Twitter can be
considered—is, actually—popular culture.
However, we do not study Twitter as popular culture.
Instead, we look at it and other social media platforms as
a place where the free labor of users is exploited (Fuchs,
2010; Terranova, 2000), or as a powerful advertisement
platform that manipulates voting behavior through tar‐
geted advertising (Tufekci, 2014). We look at it as a net‐
work that canmanipulate public opinion through the cre‐
ation of botnets (Bastos &Mercea, 2019), a place where
filter bubbles reinforce existing opinions (Pariser, 2011),
or as a platform that allows populist leaders to bypass
the traditional media of old (Enli, 2017). It seems pop‐
ular culture is studied as a means to study something
we are tempted to designate a bit sarcastically as “more
important.” An example is the recent Popular Culture
and the Civic Imagination: Case Studies of Creative Social
Change, edited by Jenkins et al. (2020). Notably and
commendably, Jenkins also spends his time on The Civic
Imagination Project, “to explore ways to inspire cre‐
ative collaborations within communities as they work
together to identify shared values and visions for the
future,” taking a step away from being a popular cul‐
ture scholar to being a community worker and activist
(Jenkins, 2021).
What we see in recent work like this is that, even
though the words “popular culture” figure prominently,
the entire conceptual framework that came with “popu‐
lar culture” and “the popular” has been relegated to the
background: the topological distinctions between elite,
mass, folk, and popular culture; the culturalist insight
that popular culture is actively produced; the Gramscian
idea that popular culture is the place where common
sense is produced and formed. Notwithstanding excep‐
tions, what remains is a “fun” object (“popular culture”)
without the conceptual framework that tied everyday
practices of meaning making to engaged research of
power structures. Or a zone of exploitation, subjection
or exclusion, of course.
This article is an attempt to trace how that change
occurred. In answering that question, we focus on sub‐
sequent transformations of the cultural studies project,
arguably the interdisciplinary domain that introduced
and disseminated the term. Our point of reference here
is what came to be known as cultural studies in the 1980s
and 1990s and originated in Britain (focused on class
and ideology), Australia (work on policy, governmental‐
ity, and the creative industries), and the US (fans, gen‐
res, and affect). While less easily identified, it originated
elsewhere too, for instance as studies of youth culture
and music in Scandinavia. We are less interested in work
that approaches popular culture as folk culture (as in
ethnologist approaches, e.g., at German universities) or
uses literary methods. The cultural studies of the 1980s
and 1990s, published in Cultural Studies and, by the end
of the decade, in the International Journal of Cultural
Studies, and the European Journal of Cultural Studies,
understood popular culture as a linking pin. It connected
what Williams called a structure of feeling with concrete
and identifiable cultural texts. Popular culture thus gave
access to the hearts and minds of “ordinary people,”
to what connected those who did not have automatic
access to the public space of politics and information.
In entertainment, politics and the popular were under‐
stood to merge.
Cultural studies’ modes of political engagement
changed, as did the popular culture objects that were
(and are) studied: from soap opera to reality TV, to
games, and social media today. This article traces a
genealogy of the debate on popular culture, in the pre‐
cise Foucauldian sense of the word, namely as “a his‐
tory of the present,” one that explains how the present
moment came into being (Foucault, 1977, p. 31). From
a vibrant, engaged form of scholarship emerged some‐
thing completely different, in which recognition of the
merits of popular culture—understood as texts‐in‐action,
the text/style/object‐related practices that are energized
by the shared use of music, TV series, clothes—have
been drastically altered and perhaps even been lost.
Even though the focus of this article is on changes in
scholarship, and especially on the way scholars have con‐
ceptually approached popular culture objects, it is worth
pointing out that as a field of objects that energize and
connect, popular culture itself has also changed, for var‐
ious technological, economic, and political reasons.
The merging of popular texts and politics that is
characteristic of cultural studies work, is prefigured in
Hall and Whannell’s collection The Popular Arts (1964)
and Fiske and Hartley’s Reading Television (1978). Both
books depend significantly on semiotics, where later
work merged semiotics and Marxism with an ethno‐
graphic approach. They need to be credited with making
well‐read “low cultural” textsworthy of serious academic
attention. Popular television as in police series, west‐
erns, Ian Fleming’s James Bond novels, jazz, and advertis‐
ing are all discussed. “Popular culture” itself, as a label,
is put to new use to undo the ideological force of the
high‐low culture distinction and expands the muchmore
restrictive use of the term by historians such as Burke
(1978/2009). The key element that changed is that the
commercial nature of these widely used and appreciated
texts no longer counted against taking them seriously.
Media and Communication, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 3, Pages 228–238 229
Earlywork on popular culture in cultural studies, in its
enthusiasm to defend the relevance and importance of
this new domain of critical work, developed a penchant
to cast different kinds of everyday, often media‐related
practices as transgressive and resisting dominant culture.
These claims may not always have been entirely convinc‐
ing. A certain level of “optimism of the will” was required
by researchers and readers, but it was not an impossi‐
ble task. There were enough links to progressive ideas
in the popular culture of the 1970s–1990s to at least
warrant the option of reading popular cultural practices
as progressive (via oppositional or aberrant decoding).
In today’s context that feels more problematic. Gamers
out to bully women journalists (Seymour, 2016), conspir‐
acy theories, the deep commercialization of making your
own online influencer video: All of these examples either
do not read as a political agenda, or when they do, do so
as a deeply exclusionary and right‐wing one. The occa‐
sional hopeful reading of e.g., RuPaul’s Drag Race, as
an emancipatory moment that queers gender conven‐
tions and offers a highly diverse range of ethnicities in
competitors on this television show, also points to host
RuPaul’s deeply neoliberal convictions. Fans and viewers
combine their love of the show with the criticism that
it discriminates against darker‐skinned queens and trans
women as contenders (Hermes & Kardolus, 2019). All of
these changes within popular culture and in its users as
well go a long way in explaining “the loss of the popu‐
lar.” However, at least equally important are a series of
paradigm shifts that gradually shifted the object of cul‐
tural studies.
Before proceeding to an overview of these paradigm
shifts, a word of clarification. The expression “loss of the
popular” might be interpreted as a story of betrayal—
a once vibrant approach was betrayed by subsequent
scholarship—and a call to return to the origins. This
is emphatically not the intention behind our argument.
Each of the changes we identify below responded to ear‐
lier problems and offered valuable ways forward. It was,
in other words, not a question of betrayal but of schol‐
arly work responding to paradigmatic deficiencies and
societal changes (and in some instances, changing politi‐
cal priorities). But the net effect of this work of advance‐
ment has been a gradual redefinition and reorientation
of the field, and it is the latter that we are trying to cap‐
ture with the expression “loss of the popular.”
2. “This Has Gone Too Far”
The first movement away from studying popular culture
through the lens of the popular did not take place as
a result of a paradigm shift, but rather as the result
of unease with the direction the study of popular cul‐
ture had taken. It is easy to forget how soon this sense
of unease emerged. Already in 1988—merely one year
after Fiske published Television Culture (Fiske, 1987)—
Meaghan Morris published her Banality in Cultural
Studies essay, which became the programmatic text in
the anti‐celebratory approach to popular culture:
I get the feeling that somewhere in some English pub‐
lisher’s vault there is a master‐disk from which thou‐
sands of versions of the same article about pleasure,
resistance, and the politics of consumption are being
run off under different names with minor variations.
(Morris, 1988, p. 15)
Morris’ critique entailed more than the complaint that
the celebratory takes on popular culture were repeti‐
tive and decontextualized. She also argued that the use
of interview material amounted to little more than a
“vox pop” technique, in which the interviewer becomes
the spokesperson (and thus privileged interpreter) for
what the interviewee actually means: “The people is
a voice, or a figure of a voice, cited in a discourse of
exegesis” (1988, p. 16, emphasis in the original). Or, in
one of the harsher judgements in the essay, “the peo‐
ple are… the textually delegated, allegorical emblem of
the critics’ own activity” (p. 17). Thus, instead of giv‐
ing a voice to “the people,” the scholars of popular cul‐
ture were depicted as having become narcissistic ventril‐
oquists, who make ordinary people utter the words they
want them to speak. The result was a left populism that
was mechanically transposed on any given situation and
lost its critical bite.
The loss of critical purchase was also at the cen‐
ter of McGuigan’s book‐length critique Cultural Populism
(1992). In a recent interview he recounts the context in
which he intervened:
In the 1980s, interpretation of the culture of “ordi‐
nary people” in cultural and media studies had
become peculiarly reverential and even celebra‐
tory….I had myself gone along with the rather more
positive estimation of contemporary popular culture
until the point—probably when reading John Fiske—
when I thought, come on, this has gone too far!
Critical judgement had been abandoned too easily.
(Moran & McGuigan, 2020, pp. 1005–1006)
McGuigan did not challenge the importance of studying
popular culture: He remained attached to the idea that
“the cultures of ordinary people are of paramount impor‐
tance” (Moran & McGuigan, 2020, p. 1007). He con‐
sidered the knee‐jerk celebration of popular culture,
however, an undesirable evolution of an otherwise
correct idea that popular culture was a terrain not
to be neglected by politically engaged intellectuals.
In this sense, these early criticisms of the cultural stud‐
ies project on popular culture represents a corrective
moment, more interested in a return to the source than
in abandoning it: not a loss of the popular but a reap‐
praisal of it.
It needs to bementioned that the correctivemoment
came with its own set of limitations. The work of John
Fiske conveniently served as a shorthand for all of
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cultural studies, which does not do justice to the wide
variety of nuanced empirical work that was dismissed as
celebratory and populist. Neither did his critics give John
Fiske any credit for the wave of scholarly enthusiasm and
inspiration that his work undeniably generated, or the
complexity of his reasoning.
3. Institutionalization: From Popular Culture to
Audience Research
Looking back, the earliest engagement with popular cul‐
ture from a cultural studies perspective we became
acquainted with, would be work at the Centre for
Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) in Birmingham.
There is the famous Resistance Through Rituals (Hall &
Jefferson, 1975) collection on youth culture and how its
rebellion against established class culture is afforded by
makingwayward use of consumer culture. The attraction
of the CCCS books and earlier stenciled papers lies at
least in part in the surprising tolerance for consumption
and what could easily be demeaned as trivial pastimes
and interests, given the keen interest in Marxist philoso‐
phy at the CCCS.
At the CCCS, the importance of everyday mean‐
ing making and of popular culture was never a given,
nor was their significance ever underestimated. Rather,
both were felt to be in need of theoretical under‐
standing. With regard to conceptualizing popular cul‐
ture, Gramsci’s writing (1971) on civil society, com‐
mon sense, and organic intellectuals was important, as
was Althusser’s work (1971). Althusser offered ideol‐
ogy and recognition as concepts, while Gramsci solved
Althusser’s problematic distinction between science and
ideology, as well as the associated notion of false con‐
sciousness. He also insisted on common sense as frag‐
mented, disjointed, and contradictory (and thus open
to change). In an essay originally written in 1977, Hall
et al. explicitly bring both arguments together: “Because
Gramsci does not work with a true/false conscious‐
ness or science/ideology model his thinking is directed
towards the contradictory possibilities within sponta‐
neous, non‐systematised forms of thinking and action”
(2007, p. 284). Allowing for contradiction might well be
the single most important contribution to critical think‐
ing that made studying popular culture at all possible.
It allows us to understand how exceptional a collec‐
tion Resistance Through Rituals is in combining aMarxist
perspective, extensive ethnographic description, and a
somewhat romantic rendering of the spirit of indepen‐
dence amongst young people. Together with Hebdige’s
slightly later Subculture: The Meaning of Style (1979),
Resistance established the political significance of youth
culture. Subculture: The Meaning of Style in turn estab‐
lished the “reading” of culture as a valid method of cul‐
tural research that Meaghan Morris would be so very
critical of ten years later. Its implied method is ethno‐
graphic, even if Hebdige does not offer a methodological
account. Like Marxism, feminism is an important source
of inspiration for the CCCS researchers. It allows for a dif‐
ferent type of argumentation, as becomes clear from the
work of the CCCSWomen’s Studies Group inWomen Take
Issue (1978). It is far less celebratory of popular culture
and resistance against dominant culture than the work
of the men is.
The famous example of Angela McRobbie’s chapter
in Women Take Issue, in which she wrote about talking
with girls about their bedrooms, provides a link to popu‐
lar music but also to acquiescence with patriarchal rules.
Both returned, popular music and women’s popular cul‐
ture, in work undertaken in the US. American media and
cultural studies scholar Larry Grossbergwrote about pop‐
ular music and resistance. He would also introduce the
notion of “affect,” which was to provide a new direction
for cultural analysis (defined broadly) by the end of the
1990s. Secondly, unaware of thework in Birmingham,UK,
Janice Radway studied romance reading in the US, fol‐
lowing a remarkably similar logic to the CCCS Women’s
group (Radway, 1984). She, too, understood women’s
reading of romances as only a temporary bid for free‐
dom that at the same time rewrites dominant ideol‐
ogy. Romance reading rebuilds masculinity as both car‐
ing and spectacular, as part of the fantasy shared by nov‐
els and readers.
In the early 1980s, studying popular culture was a
political act in itself. Authors engaged with social power
relations and subordinate groups by doing research
among different groups of popular culture users. Taking
the perspective of its users (rather than that of popu‐
lar culture’s critics) was commonly referred to as “ethno‐
graphically inspired.” Whether it was Ang’s work on
Dallas (1985), the prime time soap series, Radway’s work
on romances (1984), or Morley’s on television viewing
(1980, 1986). Their seminal texts all start from the expe‐
riences of actual viewers and readers, who talk about cul‐
tural texts that are not deemed very worthy. Their work
countered established notions about the utter lack of
quality in popular entertainment that John Hartley dates
back to the 19th‐century tenets of class culture. It also
countered how these tenets were upheld by what he
calls the knowledge class: schoolmasters in the 19th cen‐
tury, intellectuals of the “fear” school in the late 20th
century (Hartley, 1999, pp. 124, 133–134). While Morley,
Ang, and Radway offered a combination of ethnographic
method and engagement with texts, the method part of
theirworkwas notwhat attracted others to this new field
of study. They were read as alternatives to the dismissive
and pessimist “mass culture” paradigm (Jensen, 1990)
and fed a gleeful sense that consumer culture might not
be all bad.
Notably, the double political agenda their work
served was a feminist one rather than the Marxist one in
the earlier work at the CCCS. Ang (1985) suggested that
melodrama’s tragic structure of feeling allows for emo‐
tional realism, a new term with which to approach how
media texts become meaningful. Rather than reduce
reactions to the soap series as sentimental drivel, and
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a typical example of women’s culture, Ang offered an
account of the fantasy work involved in engaging with
media texts. Morley (1986) focused on both class and
gender in his work, carefully noting how masculinity in
the home is a mode of power. While attacked for inter‐
preting romance reading as a form of proto‐feminism,
Radway (1984) showed popular culture to be a space
of negotiation that temporarily rewrote patriarchal rule
and ideology, i.e., that it is women’s task to care for oth‐
ers emotionally, and not men’s.
While Ang, Morley, and Radway are seen as media
and cultural studies scholars, it is earlier work at the
CCCS that established academics studying popular cul‐
ture as “organic intellectuals” (Fernández Castro, 2017).
“The popular” and “common sense” had come to be con‐
sidered valuable categories. Morris correctly identified
the sleight of hand taking place, from the voice of the
people to the academic as a mouthpiece. She was too
irritated, however, to see how ethnographic insight had
simultaneously come to be valued in cultural studies,
stemming from academics’ personal engagement with
specific popular cultural texts as well as with a strong
wish for non‐patronizing forms of research. As Hoggart
said when talking about literacy in 1998:
You see you’re always torn if you come from my kind
of background….Perhaps excessively, you don’t want
to appear to patronize. You want to understand bet‐
ter. So I wanted to avoid two things in The Uses of
Literacy. One was the dismissal of working‐class cul‐
ture as though it was nothing, wasworthless or crude.
And the other was sentimental acceptance, which is
just as bad. (Gibson & Hartley, 1998, p. 14)
The early “organic intellectuals” cared about specific
texts and their users. As the focus on media use grew
stronger, there was a move away from “the popular” as
such while criticism of the new popular culture research
intensified. Curran criticized what he called “the new
revisionism” in mass communication research for its lack
of historical awareness of earlier pluralist communica‐
tion research that held similar tenets regarding audi‐
ences’ appreciation of media texts (1990, p. 158). When
Winlow and Hall (2007) reviewed the second edition of
Resistance Through Rituals a decade and a half later, they
reiterated a sense of disappointment that has come to
haunt cultural studies:
We did expect Hall and Jefferson to deal directly with
the main flaw of the CCCS’s work, which for many of
its critics is the assumption that youth subcultures
have the irrepressible ability to avoid the compul‐
sions and seductions of the consumer culture they
inhabit, always nimbly moving beyond its chain of
signification and processes of identification to fash‐
ion their own meanings and identities as methods of
resisting the dominant order. (p. 395)
While early popular culture research presented a happy
and irreverent mix of disciplinary backgrounds, rang‐
ing from the literary to criminology, sociology, politi‐
cal economy, and psychoanalysis, the 1990s proved a
period of attrition and disciplining of an unruly field.
For Curran (1990), the fact that researchers did not
understand their compliance with consumer culture,
pointed to how the new cultural studies work was really
just a new chapter in the tradition of mass commu‐
nication research. Winlow and Hall (2007) spoke of
post‐war sociology and a similar failure not to take mass
cultural and consumerist manipulation into account.
Others felt that the link made to ethnography is erro‐
neous. Although the new audience researchers might
well have been inspired by how critical anthropologists
took Geertz’s “thick description” further to question
the power relation between researcher and researched
(Clifford & Marcus, 1986; Geertz, 1973), they were not
actually doing fieldwork. Often, the power of popular cul‐
ture was such that researchers felt deeply familiar with
what they studied and used personal experience rather
than long interviews or participant observation in amore
formal sense. This is not incommensurable with ethnog‐
raphy (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1998), but it differed
greatly from the lengthy fieldwork that, exceptionally,
Gillespie (1995) and Thornton (1995) did conduct.
Over two decades, work that started from engage‐
ment with forms of culture that were presumed to be
worthless, brought about the revaluation of “the popu‐
lar” and popular culture, and then again lost the claim of
transcendent value in popular culture as a phenomenon
in and of itself. Neither Ang nor Radway understood
romances or melodrama as in themselves empower‐
ing, but they did appreciate how these particular texts
allowed audiences to use their agency and imagina‐
tion to make them empowering. Ten years later, nei‐
ther Gray (1992), or Gillespie (1995), nor Hermes (1995)
understood the video recorder, television, or women’s
magazines as “prime movers.” In the first instance, their
interest was in the audiences they studied. How specific
(sub)cultural forms inspire audience members was to be
culled from how informants talk about their lives and
media preferences rather than from the media texts or
practices themselves.Media texts and technologieswere
credited with providing instances of resistance. Gray, for
instance, noted how her informants explained their com‐
plicated cookers to her when talking about household
technologies, but claimed they could not program the
family VCR. A case of calculated ignorance, she argued:
Not knowing how to do this meant one chore less on
their plates. However telling, this was a minor counter‐
move compared to the much grander claim made by
Fiske for popular cultural texts. The shift away from the
“power of the popular” was mirrored in a much stronger
emphasis on method: Cultural studies was no longer a
free space in academia that attracted radical thought.
While all of these newer authors related their work to
everyday practices of meaning making and the power
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relations that shape these practices, they were more
accurately labelled as politically engaged than as radicals
or organic intellectuals.
In another decade, “aca‐fans” will reclaim free space
and, much to the amazement of outsiders, such subjects
as “Buffy studies” become part of the academic curricu‐
lum (Hills, 2002). Here a different logic returns us to pop‐
ular culture as text where unexpected discoveries can be
made. Here, too, the operative suggestion is that the gap
between literature and pulp is not as wide as is believed.
In this case, it leads to the emancipation of exceptional
texts and not their users, andwhile it broadenswhatmay
count as “high culture,” it leaves the distinction between
high and low culture intact. Otherwise, popular culture
studies will mostly turn into audience studies.
4. The Governmental Turn
The influence of governmentality studies presents a
second decisive shift away from popular culture (even
though, as we will see, it did not abandon the notion
entirely, but instead reinterprets it by linking it to its
strategic use in the wider field of culture). The influence
of governmentality studies came rather late, considering
the long‐standing influence of Foucault on cultural stud‐
ies. The focus initially was very much on Foucault’s ear‐
lier work on discourse (Foucault, 1970, 1972). When his
later work on power/knowledge, governmentality, and
practices of the self was used, it was interpreted in such
a way that it always led back to discourse. Hall’s (1997)
chapter in the Open University textbook Representation:
Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices is a
good example of this tendency to “discursify” Foucault.
This changed around the 2000s, when the exhaustion of
the Gramscian influence on cultural studies opened up
a space for reinterpreting Foucault’s work. The concept
that generated the most scholarly enthusiasm was gov‐
ernmentality. This brought a radically different approach
to culture, a paradigm shift that was less interested in
conceiving culture as the site of the creation of com‐
mon sense, than as a field crisscrossed by strategic
power relations.
A cursory glance through the table of contents
of the 2003 collection Foucault, Cultural Studies, and
Governmentality, a fairly typical selection of the work
being conducted under the rubric of governmentality
at the time, illustrates this new orientation of culture
towards strategy. There is an article on how new commu‐
nication technologies have been strategically deployed
in order to reconfigure the home along neoliberal lines
(Hay, 2003). Coffey (2003) offers an analysis of the role
of museums in the reconfiguration of Mexican society
towards neoliberalism. King (2003) analyzes the rhetoric
of cancer survivorship as embodied in initiatives like
“Race for the Cure” and examines how such conscious‐
ness cum fundraising events redefine citizenship away
from the State and towards individual ethical notions.
As diverse as these analyses might be, they all approach
cultural phenomena as strategically deployed in pursuit
of some higher good, usually involving some large‐scale
but low‐intensity transformation of society. In this sense,
the governmentality approach to culture represented
a return to earlier strands of sociological analysis that
stressed the instrumentalist character of cultural goods
(e.g., Packard’s Hidden Persuaders, 1957; but also to
some of the work of Bourdieu that stresses the role of
symbolic goods in establishing and maintaining different
social positions, e.g., Bourdieu, 1980).
Two observations are worth making here. First,
almost unnoticed, the governmentality approach to cul‐
ture eliminated the adjective popular from its concep‐
tual apparatus. (It is worth noting, in this context, that
Tony Bennett’s (2003) contribution to the above col‐
lection is simply called “Culture and Governmentality”).
Read positively, this meant that cultural studies widened
its scope to also include phenomena that were previ‐
ously considered to be “high culture.” Yet, more often
than not, this also had the consequence that the entire
notion of the popular was evacuated from the discipline.
To be sure, governmentality scholars still scrutinized pop‐
ular culture objects, ranging from computer games like
Civilization (Miklaucic, 2003) to reality TV shows like
Judge Judy (Ouellette, 2004), but they did so without
invoking the popular.
The evolution of Tony Bennett’s work is a good
example of this switch away from the popular towards
the wider field of culture. His earlier work was heav‐
ily invested in the notion of the popular, e.g., in his
writing about James Bond as a popular hero (Bennett,
1982, 1986). But by the early 1990s he had made the
switch away from the popular to study one of those
classic loci of high culture: The museum, which he ana‐
lyzed froma governmental point‐of‐view (Bennett, 1995).
The series of essays gathered in Culture: A Reformer’s
Science (Bennett, 1998) are the culmination and further
theorization of how the governmental turn impacted cul‐
tural studies’ understanding of culture.
This does not mean that the notion of popular cul‐
ture was abandoned in its entirety within governmental‐
ity studies, even though it was given a much diminished
and certainly much less prominent place. True to form,
governmentality studies at times invoked the opposition
between high and low culture, but only to the extent that
the difference was strategically deployed by those want‐
ing to intervene in a social field. In Bennett’s words:
Rather… than speaking of a contest of high culture
versus low culture, the logic of culture, viewed gov‐
ernmentally, organises a means for high culture to
reach into low culture in order to provide a route from
one set of norms for conduct to another. (1998, p. 79)
Consequently, if—and this is a big if because occasions
were scarce—governmentality scholars used the term
popular culture, it was always from the viewpoint of how
the notion was strategically deployed.
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5. Affect Theory
The move towards affect theory constitutes the final
and definitive turn away from earlier efforts to under‐
stand popular culture for its own sake. While not named
as such, affect was always part of studying popular cul‐
ture as a political moment. Ang (1985) traced an intri‐
cate relationship between the melodramatic text (and
its tragic structure of feeling that defines happiness as
always transient and short‐lived) and the emotional real‐
ism it affords. This ultimately revolved around the kind of
energy soap opera offers its viewer: It seems to be a kind
of warmth, a feeling of recognition and being recognized.
That feeling, however, was couched not in terms of affect
but in terms of ideology—an Althusserian rendering of
the power of television as ideological state apparatus.
Likewise, when Walkerdine (1986) wrote about watch‐
ing Rocky II (the movie) with the Cole family, she pointed
to how the film offers a fantasy of transformation, draw‐
ing together the text, psychoanalytical insight, and the‐
orization of identity and subjectivity. The actual pop‐
ular text is crucial to the unfolding psychic processes.
Psychoanalysis, however, is not an approach that is
much favored in cultural studies. As a theoretical appa‐
ratus it goes against the radical contextualization and
Foucauldian understanding of subjectivity that is enthu‐
siastically taken up by the field. Psychoanalysis’ asso‐
ciation with textualist approaches in film studies has
not helped. Nevertheless, in analyses like Ang’s and
Walkerdine’s, there is an untheorized (or at the very least
differently theorized) notion of affect at work.
Discussion of affect as such emerged in cultural stud‐
ies in the mid‐1990s to fill a void. When Grossberg
spoke of affective sensibility in relation to music fandom
(1992), he used it to critically intervene in a discussion
of identity and representation that felt too mechanical
to him. According to Grossberg, affect is subjective feel‐
ing, which “gives ‘color,’ ‘tone’ or ‘texture’ to our expe‐
riences” (1992, p. 57). He used the concept of affec‐
tive sensibility to think identity outside of modernist
and essentialist parameters, as historically and cultur‐
ally constructed, as fluid and fed by (popular) culture.
As a term, affect locates the “doing of popular culture”
(rather than popular culture as text) between subjects
by following in Spinoza’s footsteps; it aims to recognize
energy and change in “being affected.” While “emotion”
is used to refer to the social performance of feelings and
sensations, affect refers to the power of moments of
connection, whether positively or negatively (Wetherell,
2012). While arguably this could tie in with engaging
with the popular to understand its power, this is not
what happened.
A 1999 article by Ahmed illustrates this perfectly. Just
before Ahmed’s work turned to affect, she wrote about
“becoming” by focusing on how texts interpellate read‐
ers and construct them in doing so—which as a reader
wemay also resist. Hermode of analysis was to read pop‐
ular texts against philosophical “master texts”:
It is my position that a close and critical reading of
master‐texts such as A Thousand Plateaus is of fun‐
damental importance to Cultural Studies. This is not
because I think we should keep a canonical narrative
in place of the production of (high) theory. Rather,
we need to attend closely to texts which have been
read as originary and as charting a field. In the case
of A Thousand Plateaus, the critical appropriation of
models of becoming, bodieswithout organs, bodies as
machines and desire as positivity, all mark its powerful
dissemination in cultural theory. (Ahmed, 1999, p. 49)
The crucial text here is the philosophical one. The
retelling of the narrative of Dances With Wolves, the
1990s movie, was used as ammunition against it. Ahmed
was not interested in its appeal as popular culture, she
was interested in the homology between the two (very
different) texts that allowed her to develop what reading
“skeptically, critically, and closely” as a feminist (1999,
p. 49) might mean in relation to engagement and the
power of phantasy, and against essentialized notions
of identity. Much can be recognized here, but not in
any known configuration of what was previously known
as “doing cultural studies.” Partly it is Ahmed’s unique
approach. Equally, it was a sign of the times that we had
moved far away from the exhilaration and pleasure early
cultural studies found in subcultures and youth culture
and in popular entertainment.
6. Conclusion
While cultural studies stopped studying popular culture
in order to understand “the popular” and started using
it, among other things, as a means to confront high the‐
ory, neoliberal politics was consolidating. Initiated in the
Western world by politicians such as Thatcher, Reagan,
and Kohl, in the 1990s neoliberalism became part
of British Labour’s creative industries policy (Hewison,
2014). Culture, regardless of its provenance, was felt to
be an “expedient” for all sorts of policy initiatives and
governmentality in general (Yudice, 2004). The broad
field of media and cultural studies keenly felt that it
needed to turn away from what was now deemed to be
too naive an approach to mediated culture. It did not
help that the new reality genres that offered a public
presence to non‐professionals, or “ordinary people,” and
then the new digital platforms that allowed for amateur
production, after a brief moment of anarchist hope in
the late 1990s, could be seen to close down rather than
open multiple identity formation (Lovink, 2002, 2012;
Ytreberg, 2004). To understand the politics of the new
media culture as allowing for broad fantasies of new
selves and different worlds, felt like a small part of a trou‐
bling and much larger whole. There were exceptions, of
course, that recognized the political power in media as
information and in the pleasure of cosplay (Andeweg,
2017; Fox & Ralston, 2016; Gn, 2011) but the moment
of “the popular” was past.
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Today, when popular culture is referenced in the
hybrid field that includes cultural studies but also soci‐
ology, popular culture and the popular have become
part of a research tradition, as in John Storey’s work, or
props for quite different arguments. When Wood and
Skeggs write about reality TV, they discuss class and
gender (Skeggs et al., 2008; Storey, 2018; Wood, 2017).
When Littler makes her case against meritocracy and
unveils it as neoliberalism at work, she references the
ultra‐rich as they populate TV programs and popular fig‐
ures such as the “mumpreneur” (Littler, 2018). When
Gloria Wekker deconstructs the politics of race in the
Netherlands, the yearly Sinterklaas festivities and its cari‐
catural Petes in blackface serve as an example of popular
culture as a deeply conservative and exclusionary force
(Wekker, 2016).
It is well possible that, had Stallybrass and White
(1986) come across Sinterklaas when writing their
Politics and Poetics of Transgression, they would have
interpreted the Petes in blackface in terms of carnival
and exhilaration. Referencing medieval examples, they
would have cautioned that these were raucous and
uncouth times that did not particularly score well on
inclusion or emancipation. In as far as the popular has
carnivalesque traits, Stallybrass and White might well
have argued that these have to do with temporarily step‐
ping out of line, of suspending the normal order and turn‐
ing power relations upside down. That contemporary
scholars approach such popular energies with distrust
has very sound political reasons in times when QAnon
believers storm the US Capitol. In the current conjunc‐
ture, it seems that the Right is simply better at read‐
ing and using Gramsci. Cultural studies, on the contrary,
seems to have lost its sense of how texts might ener‐
gize and produce collectivity and utopian connections.
Of course, cultural studies has also gained critical aware‐
ness through its understanding of governmentality, and
through its theorization of affect and how the senses are
involved in processes of meaning making.
What this overview has tried to show is that the
“moment of popular culture” was a relatively short‐lived
but highly influential, foundational moment in the his‐
tory of cultural studies. This popular moment was subse‐
quently displaced by a set of related yet different theoret‐
ical problematics, that gradually moved the study of pop‐
ular culture away from the popular, in some instances
even getting rid of the adjective in its entirety. Each
of these mutations was caused by the interlocking of
changing mediatic and political environments, chang‐
ing political engagements, and changing scholarly views.
Consolidation of the move to audience studies was as
much a response to changing media technologies as
it was an attempt to attenuate and empirically ground
some of the more grandiose claims made in the 1980s.
The governmental approach argued that an exclusive
focus on popular culture blinded one to the strategic
deployment of culture in the wider sense. In addition, it
was inspired by the belief that cultural studies scholars
should engage in policy debates. Affect theory was both
an attempt to take the discipline away from an exclu‐
sive focus on discourse, meaning, and ideology, and the
result of the belief that popular texts are in need of ana‐
lysis but do not require any defense against their detrac‐
tors. And the recent, more critical work with which we
ended the previous section, no longer sees a utopian
impulse in the pleasures and enthusiasm generated by
popular culture, focusing instead on its reactionary ener‐
gies, its increasing commodification and racist lineages.
What we have gained is a shared understanding that
popular culture is a key site for the production and repro‐
duction of hegemony (Storey, 2018, p. 3). Nowadays we
know that popular culture provides us with easy means
to reflect on what binds and what divides us, whether
such forms of cultural citizenship take progressive or con‐
servative forms (Eeken & Hermes, 2021; Hermes, 2005).
That it affords wholehearted immersion and excitement
over issues that are deeply political, but quite possi‐
bly more properly belong in other realms. The open‐
ing line of this article, one of the many tweets about
the Shondaland series Bridgerton for Netflix, proves this
point: Bridgerton is based on a series of romance nov‐
els, one of the ultimate “pulp” genres. As a Netflix
offering it has become “drama.” In the hands of pro‐
ducer Shonda Rhimes, it also became a political vehicle
to suggest that racial diversity requires only the small‐
est leap of the imagination. On Twitter, however, the
series becomes a cause célèbre to vent outrage over his‐
torical inaccuracy: not just about whether or not the
English nobility might have been a more diverse group
of people than is assumed, but about its costumes and
musical scores as well. An astounding wish for author‐
itative, historically correct storytelling seems to moti‐
vate the twitterers. The point seems lost that Bridgerton
might simply be an instance of “the popular,” of that
which gives us energy and hope and a sense that every‐
thing might be better (and to h*** with historical accu‐
racy and other norms, codes, and prescriptions). A pity
really, that without the popular, we are all dancing
in our riding boots (which, for the uninitiated, is truly
extremely uncomfortable).
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